INTRODUCTION
The Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] paper addressed two conflicting challenges of designing an effective testing and reconfiguration strategy to deal with irregular topologies generated due to manufacturing faults. To support reconfiguration, Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] employed a flexible routing framework, including a Segment-based Routing (SR) algorithm ], a fault-tolerant topology agnostic routing algorithm, and a reprogrammable and scalable logic-based distributed routing implementation mechanism (LBDR) [Rodrigo et al. 2009 ]. Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] pointed out that for a given This work is supported by Indo-Spain DST project under grant DST/INT/Spain/P35/11/1 and Spanish Ministerio de Economa y Competitividad (MINECO) under grant PRI-PIBIN-2011-0989. Authors' addresses: R. Bishnoi, V. Laxmi, and M. S. Gaur, Computer Science and Engineering Department, Malaviya National Institute of Technology, JLN Marg, 302017-Jaipur, India; emails: rimpybishnoi@ gmail.com, {vlaxmi, gaurms}@mnit.ac.in; J. Flich, Universitat Politècnica de València, DISCA, Valencia, Spain; email: jflich@disca.upv.es; F. Triviño, Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, Spain. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. c 2015 ACM 1539-9087/2015/01-ART2 $15.00 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2668121 irregular topology, an underlying routing algorithm instance may not be suitable for LBDR, that is, unable to offer full connectivity and deadlock freedom. In that case, a new routing instance is required to support this, that is, complete reconfiguration of underlying routing instance. However, as the process of complete reconfiguration of a routing instance is complex and time consuming, Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] presented a fast self-reconfiguration algorithm to handle the most common NoC failures. This algorithm, at design time, computes the set of LBDR bits [Rodrigo et al. 2009 ] that need to be changed in order to support failures and stores them in a table called a transition  table (TT) . LBDR bits are calculated to support all the one-link failure combinations and most of the two-link failure combinations. In the event of a topology change, the fast self-configuration algorithm generates the new modified set of LBDR bits only by accessing the transition table. This reduces the reconfiguration time required to handle a failure, that is, transition table access time. Thus, it becomes faster than a complete reconfiguration of a routing algorithm instance. Table I shows the original transition table of Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] (shown in Figure 12 of Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] ) to support all single-link fault patterns of the topology shown in Figure 1 . This table is precomputed at design time in advance to any possible failure detection and lists all the configuration bits that need to be modified in order to support all possible cases (24 for 4 × 4 mesh) of one-link fault. The purpose is to use the table later at runtime to retain connectivity and deadlock freedom in the event of a link fault by changing the respective LBDR bits at switches. Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] represent all possible one-link failures as F0 to F23 as shown in Table I . Entry labeled as Fx represents the LBDR bits to be changed on a failure of a corresponding link marked as Fx in Figure 1 . Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] optimize the configuration algorithm for two-link failure cases by applying the algorithm of one-link failure two times, each one focused on each single-link failure, that is, accessing the transition table two times corresponding to each link failure. Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] claim to support all the single-link failure cases and most of the two-link failures. Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] have classified all the combinations in four sets: 1F, 2FC, 2FI, and 2FS sets. The 1F set represents all the combinations having only one failed link. The 2FC and 2FI sets refer to two-link failures that are compatible (supported) and not compatible (not supported), respectively, with the fast self-reconfiguration algorithm. Finally, the 2FS set refers to the case of special two-link failures that can be supported by the algorithm by adding new changes. These special changes are stored in another table referred to as special  table (ST  1 ) . Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] claim to support all link failures of sets 1F, 2FC, and 2FS by the self-reconfiguration algorithm.
Contributions: In this comments article, we demonstrate that the selfreconfiguration strategy is not able to handle all types of failures (1F, 2FC, 2FS) as reported in Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] . We have identified that the transition table (Table I) used by the self-reconfiguration algorithm contains incorrect values of LBDR bits and consequently proposed a modified transition table with the correct set of LBDR bits. Additionally, we show that the complete reconfiguration of a routing instance is mandatory to handle some of the fault cases. This observation reduces the supported number of link failures reported by Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] . New coverage results of the fast configuration algorithm are presented along with counterexamples to demonstrate the scenarios.
COUNTEREXAMPLE SCENARIOS
This section presents the example scenarios to demonstrate that the original table (Table I) used by the self-configuration algorithm provided in Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] 2:4 R. Bishnoi et al. contains incorrect values of LBDR bits. We also show the cases in which the LBDR mechanism is not compatible with the current routing instance, and a complete reconfiguration of the routing instance is mandatory to handle those cases.
Counterexample I
The entry labeled as F8 in Table I belongs to a link fault located east of switch 5 and west of switch 6 as shown in Figure 2 (a). The routing restriction situated at switch 6 before failure is removed by setting the R en bit of switch 5 and the R sw bit of switch 2 to one. The connectivity bits of particular switch output ports are set to zero and the deroute of switches 4, 5, and 6 is set to North. The R ee bit of node 4 is also set to zero.
However, according to LBDR fundamentals, to provide deadlock freedom, the deroute bit (required for nonminimal paths) for a switch should be set in such a way that it should not violate (cross) any routing restriction set by the underlying routing algorithm. Our purpose here is to demonstrate that the entry labeled as F8 contains incorrect bits and leads to a deadlocked situation. As an example, we take 4 as a source and 10 as a destination switch. The first part of LBDR logic tells that the destination is in the SE quadrant from the source switch. After knowing the destination's quadrant, the second part of LBDR logic computes a valid output port among S and E using routing and connectivity bits. In this case, it provides E as a valid output port as R es and C e of node 4 are set to one and S as an invalid output port because R se of switch 4 is set to zero due to the restriction located at switch 8. After arriving at switch 5, LBDR logic performs the same computation and finds the destination is in the SE quadrant. But at this switch, LBDR cannot provide any valid output port because R se and C e both are set to zero of switch 5. Since LBDR logic is not able to provide any output port, deroute logic gets activated. But in the entry labeled as F8, the deroute of switch 5 is set to North, which is incorrect due to the presence of the W-N routing restriction located at switch 5. Indeed, according to the configuration bits of Table I , the packet will go north as DR[5] = N and cross a routing restriction, thus potentially creating a cycle. Hence, an improper situation has occurred with the original transition table for this case (F8) in Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] , and with this set of bits, the fast configuration algorithm shall not be able to handle failure F8. Similar scenarios exist for failures labeled as F9, F14, and F15 and their corresponding entries in Table I .
Counterexample II
Another example scenario is shown in Figure 2 (b). In case of fault F4, for source 4 and any destination present in the North-East (NE) quadrant (switch 1, 2, and 3), LBDR provides both North (N) and East (E) as valid output ports, whereas in reality, only N is a valid output port as shown in Figure 2 (b). This happens because the entry corresponding to failure F4 in Table I is incorrect. On failure of a link labeled as F4, the configuration algorithm generates modified LBDR bits by accessing entry F4 of Table I that sets the R en [4] of switch 4 to one. Due to this, at switch 4, along with the N port, LBDR provides the E port also as a valid port for any destination present in its NE quadrant. But considering the E port at switch 4 for destinations present in the NE quadrant could lead to a packet drop situation at the next switch, 5, because for packets coming at the West port of switch 5 and intended to destinations located in the NE quadrant, LBDR is unable to generate any path. All possible paths from switch 5 either cross a routing restriction or require a U-turn, and both are not allowed in LBDR to provide deadlock freedom. Similar types of inconsistencies exist in all the entries of Table I except those mentioned in counter example I.
UNDERLYING PROBLEM AND FIX IN THE TRANSITION TABLE
As demonstrated in Section 1, the original table (Table I) of Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] contains incorrect bits arising out of proposed implementation. Some additional bits need to be added and some need to be updated in Table I . In order to fix the transition table, first, we fixed the checker tool internally used by the authors of the original paper. The tool initially starts with a fault-free LBDR configuration for a particular mesh dimension. For each fault combination, the tool applies the LBDR bits to be changed (TT and ST tables) in order to support the fault combination that is being analyzed. Once the corresponding LBDR bits have been modified, the next step is to check whether the final topology plus the LBDR configuration preserves connectivity and freedom from deadlock.
The connectivity property is guaranteed if any pair of end-nodes of the mesh is connected through all the possible paths provided by LBDR (minimal or nonminimal). The tool checks if every pair of end-nodes is reachable by sending a message, which is routed by using the LBDR mechanism. At the same time, the tool checks if cycles are formed. To do this, the corresponding channel dependency graph is built and cycles are searched. In case of no cycles found, the network is deadlock free. Therefore, if every pair of end-nodes is reachable without containing cycles in the path, then the fault combination is supported by the configuration algorithm.
This helped us also to understand where the problem was. Basically, the compatibility of the LBDR mechanism with the underlying routing instance was not correctly tested by the tool, as the LBDR mechanism may not be compatible with the current routing instance generated due to failure. In this case, a new routing instance needs to be configured, that is, complete reconfiguration of routing instance. For example, as shown in counter example I, due to failure F8, the available minimal path between some source-destination pair gets faulty and becomes a blocked path.
2 This failure is not visible from source switches like 0 or 4 because LBDR is unable to capture this. Due to this, LBDR keeps forwarding packets to a blocked path having failure F8 and results into a nonsupported topology. Hence, this particular routing instance generated from link failure F8 is not compatible with the LBDR mechanism. To solve this problem, the tool has been improved in order to consider the compatibility of the LBDR mechanism with the current routing instance. Now the tool is able to test all the possible branches that are generated by LBDR at a given switch. In case one of these branches fails and blocks at some intermediate switch, then the fault combination under test is flagged as not covered. These are the cases that require a complete reconfiguration of the routing instance and are shown using an asterisk in Table II (F8, F9, F14, F15 ).
Besides this, another reason is the generation of incorrect values of routing bits in the event of any failure. For example, as shown in counter example II, on link failure F4, the self-configuration algorithm sets routing bit R en of switch 4 to one as shown in Table I . This resulted in a nonsupported failure. To solve this, Table I is corrected and the modified set of bits is provided in Table II . Each entry of Table II is now tested by the tool against the connectivity and deadlock freedom. Finally, as can be deduced, the test is now more restrictive and the coverage is slightly reduced as shown in the next section.
We have incorporated these modifications and computed a new set of LBDR bits as shown in Table II . Using these modified sets of bits, each fault can be handled properly and LBDR provides valid output ports (counterexample I and II). The table shows in boldface the new bits that need to be changed. Also, those entries labeled with an asterisk require a slow reconfiguration strategy, as during the transition potential deadlocks may arise. This is because these configurations require changing the location of some routing restrictions, which is deadlock prone. The mechanism proposed in Strano et al. [2012] can be used to avoid deadlocks. Figure 3 shows the most complex case for F14, which involves a reconfiguration process to avoid deadlock. The figure shows the situation before and after the failure. Notice that routing restrictions located at switches 8 and 9 between their North and East ports have been moved to switches 9 and 10 between their North and West ports. Finally, we have accordingly modified the special table (ST) in order to increase coverage for special two-link failures. As the number of combinations generated from two-link failures is very high, the corresponding ST table is also too long to be detailed in this article.
New Coverage Results of the Configuration Algorithm
In this section, we show the obtained coverage results of the configuration algorithm of Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] with the updated table for all the possible combinations of one-and two-link faults. Table III shows the new coverage result of the fast selfconfiguration algorithm for all one-link fault cases in all the possible mesh dimensions. Notice that now the self-configuration algorithm is not able to offer full-coverage support, because few one-link failure cases belonging to set 1F are not compatible with the LBDR mechanism. The corresponding failures for a 4 × 4 mesh are identified in this comments article and marked using an asterisk in Table II . These failures require the complete reconfiguration of the underlying routing instance and cannot be handled by the fast self-configuration method.
In the case of two-link faults, there are several topologies that are not supported, as was the case in the previous version of the algorithm. Table IV shows the new coverage compared with the previous one. According to our new tool, the new coverage is decreased and the number of supported combinations is reduced by 4.5% and 10.4% for 4 × 4 and 8 × 8 meshes, respectively. The main reason lies in the adaptivity of the LBDR mechanism. As we have mentioned previously, the new tool has been enhanced in order to test all the possible output ports provided by the LBDR mechanism at any hop along the path. Therefore, the new tool is accurate in finding an incorrect path and therefore labels the topology as invalid.
CONCLUSIONS
The issues raised in this comments article are about the fast self-configuration part proposed in Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] . In this comment, we gave counterexamples covering different possible scenarios to demonstrate that the self-configuration algorithm of Ghiribaldi et al. [2013] is not sufficient to handle all types of single-(1F set) and double-link faults (2FC and 2FS sets). Through appropriate counterexamples, we
